We use the citizen-candidate model to study electoral outcomes under the Alternative Vote rule, a voting method often proposed as a replacement to the prevalent Plurality rule. We show that, like the Plurality rule, the Alternative Vote rule deters multiple candidate clusters and the presence of candidates at more than two positions. Moreover, the Alternative Vote rule tends to support less policy polarization than the Plurality rule. These results stand in contrast to those obtained under other proposed voting rules, Approval Voting in particular, which are prone to candidate clustering and, as a result, can support greater policy polarization vis-à-vis the Plurality rule.
INTRODUCTION
The Plurality rule 1 cities (e.g., London, San Francisco). 2 The Alternative Vote rule works as follows: Each voter rank-orders candidates from …rst to last. A candidate who receives a majority of …rst place preferences is declared the winner. If no candidate receives a majority of …rst place preferences, then the candidate i getting the least number of …rst place preferences is eliminated and the candidates who are ranked second after candidate i become …rst on the ballots. If a candidate receives a majority of …rst place preferences on the altered ballots, then he is elected. Otherwise, the process is repeated until a candidate receives a majority of …rst place preferences. 3 An argument sometimes put forward in favor of the Alternative Vote rule vis-à-vis the Plurality rule is that the Alternative Vote rule provides better electoral prospects for centrist/moderate candidates over extremists which, under standard assumptions on the distribution of voters'policy preferences, are associated with an 1 The Plurality rule is the voting rule under which each voter casts one vote to one candidate, and the candidate who receives the most votes is elected. 2 For a list of places that currently use the Alternative Vote rule for elections, see fairvote.org. 3 The Alternative Vote rule is variously referred to as Instant-Runo¤ Voting (IRV), Transferable
Vote, Ranked Choice Voting, or Preferential Voting. There also exists variants of the basic system, for instance, the Coombs Rule under which the candidate receiving the most last place preferences is eliminated.
increase in social welfare as measured, for example, by a utilitarian or a Rawlsian social welfare function. For instance, Merrill (1988) and Grofman and Feld (2004) , focusing on the mechanical aspects of the voting rules, show that the Alternative Vote rule is more likely to elect the Condorcet winner (if one exists) than the Plurality rule does. In a standard spatial voting setting with a single-dimensional policy space and single-peaked preferences, the Condorcet winner is a centrist/moderate candidate in the sense that it is the candidate most preferred by the median voter.
A similar type of conclusion can be reached if one focuses instead on candidates' platform choices. In the standard Downsian framework, where a …xed number of candidates choose their platforms along the line in order to maximize their respective probabilities of being elected and where voters have single-peaked preferences, there exists a single convergent equilibrium 4 under the Alternative Vote rule. Under this equilibrium, all candidates choose to stand at the median voter's ideal policy. 5 The extent of policy polarization is therefore minimal. By contrast, Cox (1987, 1990) shows that no convergent equilibria exist in multi-candidate elections under the Plurality rule. Thus, the Plurality rule provides incentives for candidates to diverge, while the Alternative Vote rule provides incentives for candidates to converge.
One restrictive feature of the existing literature on the comparative properties of the Plurality and Alternative Vote rules is that the analysis is carried out under the assumption of a common set of candidates/alternatives. However, it is well known that di¤erent voting rules provide di¤erent incentives for candidates to stand for election. Dutta et al. (2001) shows that, under a very weak unanimity condition, every non-dictatorial voting rule is subject to strategic candidacy behavior. Lijphart (1994) , among others, shows that di¤erent electoral systems are associated with di¤erent numbers of candidates/parties. It is therefore important, when comparing voting rules, to explicitly take into account the fact that di¤erent voting rules may result in systematically di¤erent sets of candidates (with di¤erent policy platforms) running for election.
In this paper, we make three contributions to the existing literature. First, we develop a formal model of electoral competition under the Alternative Vote rule 4 A convergent equilibrium is a symmetric equilibrium, where all candidates follow the same strategy. 5 A formal proof is available from the authors.
when candidacy decisions are strategic. 6 This enables us to evaluate the endogenously determined number and positions of candidates under the Alternative Vote rule with those under the Plurality rule.
Second, our analysis suggests that, similar to the Plurality rule, the Alternative Vote rule tends to support a two-party system (formally, the equilibrium number of candidates does not exceed two Finally, we show that the policy positions supported as electoral equilibria under the Alternative Vote rule are (weakly) less polarized as compared to those under the Plurality rule, even when candidacy is endogenized. This …nding is not a priori obvious in light of our previous …ndings concerning the non-ranking scoring rules (Dellis and Oak, 2014) . 8 In that paper we show that non-ranking scoring rules support less policy polarization than the Plurality rule when the set of candidates is …xed, but can support more policy polarization when candidacy is endogenous.
This happens because, unlike the Plurality rule, non-ranking scoring rules provide incentives for multiple candidates to stand for election at the same position, which worsens the electoral prospects of centrist/moderate candidates compared to when the election is held under the Plurality rule.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature. Section 3 presents the model. Section 4 characterizes equilibria and compares policy polarization under the Plurality rule and the Alternative Vote 6 We continue to assume that voting is sincere, which is consistent with experimental evidence on voting behavior in Alternative Vote rule elections (e.g., Van der Straeten et al., 2010) and with intuition given the complexity of the Alternative Vote rule. 7 Duverger's law (Duverger, 1954; Riker, 1982) states that the Plurality rule tends to favor a two-party system. 8 A non-ranking scoring rule is a voting rule under which every voter is given multiple votes to cast for di¤erent candidates, and the candidate who receives the most votes is elected.
rule. Section 5 concludes with a summary of the main results and a discussion of the robustness of our results. All proofs are in the Appendix. 
RELATED LITERATURE

MODEL
In this section we adopt a simple citizen-candidate model, based on Osborne and Slivinski (1996) and Dellis and Oak (2014) , to characterize equilibrium outcomes under the Alternative Vote rule and the Plurality rule.
The environment
Consider a community that must elect a policymaker to choose and implement a policy x 2 X. The policy space X is assumed to be unidimensional, say X = [0; 1].
10
The electorate N consists of a continuum of citizens. Without loss of generality,
we normalize the mass of citizens to one. Each citizen is characterized by an ideal policy x n 2 X. Citizens' ideal policies are distributed over X according to some cumulative distribution function F . We make the standard assumptions that F is continuous and strictly increasing over X. Let us denote by m the ideal policy of the median citizen; formally, F (m) = 1=2. Without loss of generality, we let m = 1=2, and refer to m as the position of the median citizen. A citizen n with ideal policy x n gets utility u n (x) = u (x x n ) from policy x 2 X. For expositional purposes, we assume that u n (x) = u (jx x n j), i.e., citizens'preferences are symmetric around their ideal policy. Furthermore, we assume that u (:) is a concave and strictly decreasing function, and normalize u (0) to zero.
There is a …nite set of potential candidates P who decide whether to stand for election. In line with the citizen-candidate approach, the set of potential candidates P is a subset of the electorate N . 11 Being a citizen himself, each potential candidate i 2 P has ideal policy x i 2 X and obtains utility u i (x) = u (jx x i j) from policy x.
As a central tenet of the citizen-candidate approach, a potential candidate i cannot credibly commit to implementing any policy other that x i . In consequence, we shall refer to the ideal policy of a potential candidate as his position. In addition to the utility u i (x) over the policy outcome, a potential candidate i obtains a utility 0 from being elected the policymaker. purely policy-motivated. We discuss in Section 5 the robustness of our conclusions to the introduction of o¢ ce-motivation, i.e., > 0. In that section we also discuss the generality and limitations of assuming three positions for potential candidates.
Policymaking process
The policymaking process is modeled as a three-stage game. At the …rst stage, potential candidates decide, simultaneously and independently, whether to stand for election or not. In standing for election a candidate incurs a utility cost > 0.
At the second stage, provided there is a non-empty set of candidates, an election is held. Then, at the third stage, the elected candidate chooses and implements a policy. If no candidate stands for election, a default policy x 0 2 X is implemented and the game ends. Following Osborne and Slivinski (1996), we let u n (x 0 ) = 1 for every citizen n. As shall become clear in the next section, this assumption is without loss of generality for our main result (Proposition 1). We now describe each stage in greater detail, proceeding backward.
Policy selection stage
Given that this is the last stage of the game and that candidates cannot credibly commit to the policy they will implement if elected, the policymaker chooses to implement his ideal policy.
Election stage
Let C P be a non-empty set of candidates who are running for election. We denote the number of candidates by c #C, and relabel the candidates from 1 to c in such a way that x 1 x 2 ::: x c .
Let n (C) = ( n i = c indicates that citizen n ranks candidate i last. 12 We denote the vote pro…le by (C).
Voting is assumed to be sincere, i.e., each citizen ranks her most preferred candidate …rst, the next most preferred candidate second, and so on, up to the least preferred candidate, who is ranked last. Formally,
sincere if for each pair of candidates, i and j, we have
A vote pro…le (C) is sincere if every citizen n's voting decision n (C) is sincere.
Indi¤erence ties are broken randomly. 13 We consider two cases, one case in which the election is held under the Plurality rule and another case in which the election is held under the Alternative Vote rule.
Under the Plurality rule, only the …rst positions on the individual ballots count.
More speci…cally, the vote total of a candidate i is given by
where (S) denotes the measure of a set S. The candidate who receives the largest mass of …rst positions is elected. Ties are broken randomly. The winning set is given by W (C; ) i 2 arg max j2C V j (C; ) . Given the random tie-breaking rule, the probability that a candidate i is elected is given by
Under the Alternative Vote rule, all positions on individual ballots may count.
More speci…cally, under the Alternative Vote rule, candidates are eliminated sequentially, one at a time. At the …rst elimination round, the candidate who receives the smallest mass of …rst positions is eliminated, and his name is removed 1 2 Observe that we implicitly rule out abstention. We do so because of costless voting and complete information; with a …nite (possibly large) electorate, vote abstention would be a weakly dominated strategy. 1 3 This means that if every citizen in a set S is indi¤erent between ranking candidate i and candidate j at the k th and (k + 1) st positions, then half of them rank candidate i at the k th position and candidate j at the (k + 1) st position, while the other half rank candidate j at the k th position and candidate i at the (k + 1) st position. from individual ballots. We then move to the second round, where the candidate who is now ranked the highest on the smallest mass of ballots is eliminated, and his name is removed from individual ballots as well. The process is repeated until only one candidate is left. This candidate is declared the election winner. At each elimination round, ties are broken randomly.
We start by formalizing the …rst elimination round under the Alternative Vote
V j (C; ) be the set of candidates who are receiving the smallest mass of …rst positions and, therefore, who are tying for …rst elimination. The probability that candidate i 2 L 1 (C; )
is the …rst candidate to be eliminated is equal to 1=#L 1 (C; ). We denote by
) the candidate who is e¤ectively eliminated …rst.
We proceed recursively for the other elimination rounds. Denote
the set of candidates who have not yet been eliminated at round t = 2; :::; c 1,
The mass of citizens who rank candidate i 2 C t highest among the candidates in C t at elimination round t is given by
Following the de…nitions of L 1 (C; ) and L 1 , we de…ne the set of candidates who are tying for elimination at round t as
, and denote by L t 2 L t (C t ; ) the candidate who is e¤ectively eliminated at round t.
We write an elimination sequence L = L The winning set is given by W (C; ) fi 2 C :
The probability that a candidate i is elected is given by i (C; )
.
Candidacy stage
Let e i 2 f0; 1g denote the candidacy decision of a potential candidate i, where e i = 0
indicates potential candidate i chooses to not run for election and e i = 1 indicates he chooses to run. We denote the candidacy pro…le by e = (e i ) i2P and the associated set of candidates by C (e) fi 2 P : e i = 1g. We sometimes write e = (e i ; e i ),
where e i corresponds to the candidacy pro…le of all potential candidates other than i.
Given a candidacy pro…le e and a vote pro…le (:), the expected utility of a potential candidate i is given by
where
denotes the probability that neither potential candidate stands for election and, therefore, that the default policy x 0 is implemented.
A candidacy pro…le e constitutes a candidacy equilibrium given voter pro…le
U i e i ; e i ; for every potential candidate i 2 P.
Political equilibrium
An equilibrium is a pair (e ; (:)) where: (i) (C) is a sincere vote pro…le for every non-empty set of candidates C; and (ii) e is a candidacy pro…le given vote pro…le (:). It is easy to show by construction that an equilibrium exists for any con…guration of positions (x L ; x M ; x R ).
De…ning policy polarization
Intuitively, we say that a voting rule supports more policy polarization than another voting rule if 1) it supports the adoption of more extreme policies (i.e., policies that lie further away from the median m) and 2) it does not support the adoption of more moderate policies (i.e., policies that lie closer to the median). We say that a voting rule supports the adoption of a policy if for a con…guration of positions (x L ; x M ; x R ) that includes this policy, an equilibrium exists where a potential candidate at this position is elected with a strictly positive probability. is adopted with probability one in every equilibrium and for every con…guration of positions.
We are now ready to de…ne formally our notion of policy polarization. In words, a voting rule r supports more policy polarization than a voting rule s when 1) every policy which adoption can be supported by r but not by s is more extreme than any of the policies which adoption can be supported by s, and 2) every policy which adoption can be supported by s but not by r is more moderate than any of the policies which adoption can be supported by r.
Definition 2 (Policy polarization
ANALYSIS
In this section, we start by providing a complete characterization of equilibria under the Plurality rule and under the Alternative Vote rule. We then compare the degree of policy polarization supported by the two rules.
Equilibrium characterization
We start by establishing some results on the equilibrium number and locations of candidates under the two rules.
Lemma 1. Let (e ; ) be any equilibrium under the Plurality rule or under the Alternative Vote rule. We have x i 6 = x j for all candidates i; j 2 C (e ), i 6 = j.
Thus, no two candidates are standing at the same position, whether the election is held under the Plurality rule or under the Alternative Vote rule.
To understand the intuition underlying this result, consider a candidacy pro…le in which at least two candidates are running at the same position. Clearly, this cannot be an equilibrium candidacy pro…le if all candidates are at the same position; one of these candidates would be better o¤ not running since by doing so he would save the candidacy cost while the policy outcome would be unchanged. Now consider a candidacy pro…le with several positions at which candidates are running.
The intuition as to why this pro…le cannot be an equilibrium di¤ers under the Plurality rule and under the Alternative Vote rule. Under the Plurality rule, the result relies on the splitting-the-vote e¤ect. Speci…cally, two or more candidates at the same position would split their votes, thereby helping the election of a candidate standing at another position. By contrast, under the Alternative Vote rule, the result relies on the sequential elimination process. Speci…cally, the presence of two or more candidates at the same position would lengthen the elimination sequence without changing the probability distribution over policy outcomes since the votes of an eliminated candidate are transferred to his closest neighbor(s). It follows that under both rules all the candidates in excess of one at a position would be strictly better o¤ deviating by not running since they would each save on the candidacy cost while (weakly) increasing the probability with which their ideal policy is adopted. This would contradict the premise that the candidacy pro…le is part of an equilibrium.
We now proceed to characterize the sets of equilibria under the two rules. For this purpose, we partition the set of equilibria into three subsets, namely, the subsets of 1-, 2-and 3-position equilibria, in which there are candidates at one, two and three positions, respectively.
We start by characterizing the 1-position equilibria. 
The intuition underlying this result runs as follows. First, we already know from Lemma 1 that in equilibrium no two candidates are running at the same position.
It follows trivially that in any 1-position equilibrium, only one candidate is running for o¢ ce. Second, the fact that only one candidate runs for o¢ ce implies that the 1-position equilibria are equivalent under the Plurality rule and the Alternative Vote rule. 14 Finally, it must be that no other potential candidate (at another position) is willing to enter the race. This happens if: (1) candidate i's position is x M , since he would be preferred by a majority of citizens and the entrant would be defeated with probability one; or (2) candidate i's position is x L or x R , and the candidacy cost exceeds the utility gain for a candidate at the other position in fx L ; x R g entering the race and tying for …rst place. 15 Next, we proceed to characterize the 2-position equilibria. We de…ne x
as the ideal policy of a citizen who is indi¤erent between x L and x M . Likewise, we de…ne x
as the ideal policy of a citizen who is indi¤erent between x M and x R . The following lemma provides a complete characterization of the 2-position equilibria under each of the two voting rules. (i) The candidacy pro…le e is such that C (e ) = fi; jg, with x i = x L and x j = x R ;
(ii)
; and (iii-Plurality rule) Under the Plurality rule, one of the following holds true
(iii-Alternative Vote rule) Under the Alternative Vote rule, one of the following holds true
1 4 Clearly, both voting rules elect the single candidate. If the candidate deviates by not running, then the default policy x 0 is implemented under both rules. If another potential candidate deviates by entering the race, then there will be two candidates running and the candidate preferred by the median citizen is elected under both voting rules. 1 5 Given the (weak) concavity of the utility function u (:), the latter condition is su¢ cient to deter a potential candidate to enter the race against a candidate at x L or x R .
3.
Condition (i) speci…es that in any 2-position equilibrium, candidates are running at x L and x R , whether the election is held under the Plurality rule or under the Alternative Vote rule. The intuition underlying this condition is related to the fact that there are only two candidates running for election (by Lemma 1). It follows that if one candidate were positioned at x M , he would be strictly preferred to the other candidate by a majority of citizens and would be elected outright.
The other candidate would therefore be strictly better o¤ deviating by not running since he would save on the candidacy cost while the election outcome would be unchanged. This would contradict the premise that the candidacy pro…le is part of an equilibrium.
Condition (ii) speci…es a lower bound on the degree of polarization between x L and x R . Essentially, the two positions must be su¢ ciently polarized that neither candidate would be better o¤ deviating by not running. Speci…cally, the electorate is equally split between the two candidates, and each candidate is elected with probability 1/2. If one candidate were to deviate by not running, he would save on the candidacy cost, but the other candidate would now be elected outright. The bene…t from the deviation is then equal to the candidacy cost , while the cost is equal to
. For a candidate to not be willing to deviate, it must then be that the cost
is at least as large as the bene…t . This condition is the same under the Plurality rule as under the Alternative Vote rule given that the deviation cost is associated with sets of one and two candidates and that the two voting rules di¤er only with three or more candidates running.
Finally, condition (iii) speci…es an upper bound on the degree of polarization between x L and x R . Essentially, the two positions must not be so polarized that a potential candidate at x M would want to enter the race. Contrary to the lower bound on policy polarization that was speci…ed in condition (ii), the upper bound speci…ed in condition (iii) varies with the voting rule (since it involves sets with three candidates). Speci…cally, if a potential candidate at x M were to enter the race, then: 1) all citizens with ideal policy to the left of x, preferring x L to x M and x R , would rank the candidate at x L …rst; 2) all citizens with ideal policy between
x and x, preferring x M to x L and x R , would rank the candidate at x M …rst; and 3) all citizens with ideal policy to the right of x, preferring x R to x M and x L , would rank the candidate at x R …rst. First-place vote totals would then be equal to F (x), F (x) F (x) and 1 F (x) for the candidate at x L , the candidate at x M and the candidate at x R , respectively. For a potential candidate at x M to be willing to enter the race, he must anticipate that he will be elected with positive probability. Under the Plurality rule, a candidate at x M is elected with positive probability if and only if he receives a plurality of votes, i.e., F (x) F (x) max fF (x) ; 1 F (x)g. Under the Alternative Vote rule, a candidate at x M is elected with positive probability if and only if he does not receive strictly fewer …rst-place votes than any other candidate, i.e., considers the case where a candidate at x M would be elected with probability zero and, therefore, would not want to enter the race.
Our last lemma rules out the existence of 3-position equilibria under either of the two voting rules.
Lemma 4.
There is no 3-position equilibrium, whether the election is held under the Plurality rule or under the Alternative Vote rule.
The intuition underlying this result is the same whether the election is held under the Plurality rule or under the Alternative Vote rule. Essentially, the result follows from the fact that if a 3-position equilibrium were to exist, there would be only one candidate standing for election at each position (by Lemma 1) . Given that candidacy is costly and that the utility function is (weakly) concave, the candidate at x L or the candidate at x R (or both) would be better o¤ deviating by not running and letting the candidate at x M winning outright (which would necessarily happen since the candidate at x M is the Condorcet winner and there would be only two candidates left).
Comparing policy polarization
We are now ready to establish our main result.
Proposition 1. The Alternative Vote rule supports weakly less policy polarization than the Plurality rule.
To understand this result, we start by noticing that the set of policies which can be supported in equilibrium is an interval centered at the median m. 16 To see this, …rst recall from Lemma 4 that the set of 3-position equilibria is empty under both voting rules. Hence, for both voting rules the set of policies which can be supported is characterized by the 1-and 2-position equilibria only. Now, recall from Lemma 2 that the set of 1-position equilibria is equivalent under both voting rules. Moreover, together condition 2 of Lemma 2 and condition (ii) of Lemma 3 imply that 1) every 1-position equilibrium is more moderate than any 2-position equilibrium, and 2) the upper-bound on polarization for the 1-position equilibria coincides with the lower-bound on polarization for the 2-position equilibria. Hence the result that the set of policies which can be supported in equilibrium is an interval centered around the median.
This observation implies that the di¤erence in the levels of policy polarization that the Alternative Vote rule and the Plurality rule can support is captured by the upper-bounds on polarization for the 2-position equilibria. These upper-bounds are given by condition (iii) of Lemma 3. More speci…cally, this condition speci…es that positions x L and x R cannot be too polarized so that no potential candidate at x M would be better o¤ deviating from his candidacy strategy by standing for election.
How polarized x L and x R can be while still deterring a moderate from entering the race depends on the voting rule.
Under the Plurality rule, a moderate candidate would need to receive a plurality of votes to be elected, i.e., to receive more votes than the candidate at x L and than the candidate at x R . Formally, a candidate at x M entering the race would receive votes from all citizens with ideal policy between x and x; his vote share would thus be equal to F (x) F (x). At the same time, the candidate at x L (resp. x R ) would receive votes from all citizens with ideal policy to the left of x (resp. to the right of x), and his vote share would thus be equal to F (x) (resp.
1 F (x)). Hence, a potential candidate at x M entering the race would be defeated, and therefore necessarily deterred from entering the race, only if
Under the Alternative Vote rule, a moderate candidate would only need to not be eliminated at the …rst count in order to be elected, i.e., he would only need to receive more …rst-place votes than the candidate at x L or than the candidate at x R . This is because a candidate at x M would be the Condorcet winner and, at the second count, would defeat any of the other two candidates. Formally, a potential candidate at x M entering the race would be defeated, and therefore necessarily deterred from entering the race, only if In the course of our analysis we made several assumptions. Some of these assumptions were made to simplify the analysis. One of these assumptions was that candidates are purely policy-motivated, i.e., the ego rent = 0. This assumption makes for a clean analysis and sharp results. It is easy to see that our qualitative results carry over to cases where < 2 , where stands for the candidacy cost. This The di¢ culty of establishing results for cases with more than three positions arises due to the fact that the Alternative Vote rule violates the monotonicity property (Brams and Fishburn, 1984) . This feature of the Alternative Vote rule implies that the presence or absence of a candidate may in some cases harm his direct neighbors and in other cases improve their electoral prospects.
There is also a number of assumptions that were made to facilitate comparison with the related literature and to isolate the e¤ect of endogenizing candidacy. These assumptions are the unidimensionality of the policy space, the completeness of information, and the focus on a one-shot election. Considering dynamic elections, introducing information incompleteness or allowing a multidimensional policy space goes beyond the scope of the present paper, and is left for future work. [31] Weber, S. 1992. "On hierarchical spatial competition." Review of Economic Studies, 59: 407-425.
[32] Weber, S. 1998. "Entry deterrence in electoral spatial competition." Social Choice and Welfare, 15: 31-56.
[33] Xefteris, D. 2014. "Mixed equilibria in runo¤ elections." Games and Economic Behavior, 87: 619-623.
APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1. We prove the result by contradiction. Let (e; ) be an equilibrium, with the corresponding set of candidates C (e). Assume by way of contradiction that x i = x j for some i; j 2 C (e), i 6 = j.
First, we consider the case where the election is held under the Plurality rule.
Key to observe is that several candidates at a position split their votes. To see this,
we start by introducing some notation. Let X (e) fx 2 fx L ; x M ; x R g : x k = x for some k 2 C (e)g be the set of positions at which candidates are standing. Also, let c i # fk 2 C (e) : x k = x i g be the number of candidates (including candidate i) standing at the same position as candidate i. The vote total of any candidate j with x j = x i is given by
Suppose candidate i were to deviate by not running for election. We denote by e e the candidacy pro…le after the deviation where e e i = 0 and e e k = e k for all k 2 Pn fig.
The set of candidates is now C (e e) = C (e) n fig and candidates'vote totals are 8 < :
for all k 2 C (e e) , x k 6 = x i :
Hence the deviation weakly increases the probability that x i is implemented. It follows that candidate i's expected utility is such that U i (e e; ) U i (e; ) + > U i (e; ). Hence candidate i is strictly better o¤ deviating, which contradicts that e is an equilibrium candidacy pro…le.
Second, we consider the case where the election is held under the Alternative Vote rule. The key here is that policy outcomes depend on the support for each position, not on whether there are multiple candidates or a single candidate at a position.
Let e e be the candidacy pro…le in which e e i = 0 and e e k = e k for all k 2 Pn fig.
Also, let x (e) and x (e e) denote the probability distributions over fx L ; x M ; x R g associated with candidacy pro…les e and e e, respectively.
If e is a 1-position candidacy pro…le (i.e., x h = x k for all h; k 2 C (e)), then we trivially get x (e e) = x (e). Hence U i (e e; ) > U i (e; ) given candidacy cost > 0, which contradicts that e is an equilibrium candidacy pro…le.
Suppose now that e is a 2-position candidacy pro…le (i.e., there are two positions at which candidates are standing). We …rst observe that x M cannot be one of the two positions. To see this, assume the contrary. Pick an elimination sequence L 2 (C (e) ; ). One possibility is that x k = x M for the two candidates in C c 1 ,
i.e., the two candidates who have not yet been eliminated at round c 1. The other possibility is that there is a round t 0 < c 1 at which there is only one candidate h left at x M . Candidate h is then the Condorcet winner and his vote total V t h (C t ; ) > 1=2 at every round t = t 0 ; :::; c 1. Thus, for both possibilities a candidate at x M is elected. Since this is true for any elimination sequence, the candidate(s) standing at the other position would be strictly better o¤ deviating by not running, a contradiction. Hence candidates must be standing at x L and x R .
Observe that the electorate is equally divided between x L and x R . It follows that in any elimination sequence L 2 (C; ) for C = C (e) ; C (e e), the candidates h 
with x L and x R adopted with probability 1/2 each. It follows that U i (e e; ) = U i (e; ) + > U i (e; ), a contradiction.
We get from above that e must be a 3-position candidacy pro…le (i.e., there must be candidates standing at each of the three positions). W.l.o.g. we transform elimination sequences such that candidate i is the …rst candidate at x i to be eliminated.
Formally, for every L 2 (C (e) ; ), let t = min ft 2 f1; :::; c 1g : 1. There exists a round t 2 f1; :::; c 1g such that
(C (e) ; ), i.e., at round t the candidates at x i are not in a tie for elimination with candidates at other positions. We partition (C (e) ; ) into families which each contains all the elimination sequences with a same elimination ordering of the candidates at positions other than x i . Observe that the adopted policy is the same in every elimination sequence belonging to a family .
Moreover, each family contains c i ! elimination sequences.
If candidate i were to deviate by not running, there would be (c i 1)! elimination sequences in every family . Moreover, each elimination sequence e L in a family of (C (e e) ; ) corresponds to an elimination sequence L in the family of (C (e) ; ) such that
for t = t; :::; c 2:
Hence the deviation of candidate i would reduce in each family the number of sequences by the same number c i and would shorten every elimination sequence by one round, but x (e e) = x (e). It follows that U i (e e; ) > U i (e; ), a contradiction.
2. There exists a pair of elimination sequences L; e L 2 (C (e) ; ) such that be eliminated is at x L or x R , then his votes are transferred to the candidate(s) at x M , and x M is adopted in this family and in the corresponding family of (C (e e) ; ). For each family in which the candidate is instead at x M , then his votes are transferred to x L and x R , and each of these two positions is adopted with probability 1/2 in this family and in the corresponding family of (C (e e) ; ). To sum up, we get x (e e) = x (e) again, and thus the contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 2. Let (e; ) be a 1-position equilibrium under either the Plurality rule or the Alternative Vote rule. We already know from Lemma 1 that there is a single candidate, say candidate i, running for election. The remaining of the proof is identical to the proof of Lemma 1 in Dellis and Oak (2014).
Proof of Lemma 3. Let (e; ) be a 2-position equilibrium under either the Plurality rule or the Alternative Vote rule.
First, we establish the necessity of condition (i). We already know from Lemma 1 that there must be only two candidates running for election, one at each position.
Without loss of generality we call the two candidates i and j, and let x i < x j . That we must have x i = x L and x j = x R follows because the candidate at x M would be the Condorcet winner and, since there are only two candidates, would be elected with probability one. The other candidate would then be better o¤ not running since he would then save on the candidacy cost while the election outcome would be left unchanged.
Second, we establish the necessity of condition (ii). For (e; ) to be an equilibrium, it must be that neither of the candidates would be better o¤ deviating by not running. Given condition (i), we have that each of the two candidates is elected with probability 1/2. Candidate i's expected utility is thus equal to
If candidate i were to deviate by not running, then candidate j would be elected outright and candidate i's expected utility would be equal to u (jx L x R j). Thus, candidate i does not want to deviate only if
Hence the necessity of condition (ii).
Third, we establish the necessity of condition (iii). Since (e; ) is an equilibrium, it must be that neither potential candidate at x M would be better o¤ deviating by entering the race. Pick a potential candidate h 2 P with x h = x M , and construct candidacy pro…le e e such that e e h = 1 and e e k = e k for all k 2 Pn fhg. Letting 
From here it is easy to check that potential candidate h would be worse o¤ entering the race only if one of the four conditions in (iii-Plurality rule) is satis…ed. 
Suppose candidate L were to deviate by not running. Candidate M would then be elected outright, and candidate L's utility would be equal to u (jx L x M j). Since (e; ) is an equilibrium, it must then be that
which, together with > 0, implies M < 1 and
At the same time, the concavity of u (:) implies
Taken together, these two inequalities imply
The next lemma establishes that under either of the two voting rules, the set of policies which adoption can be supported is an interval. It follows that the set of Proof of Lemma 5. It follows straightforwardly from condition (1) in Lemma 2 that for any con…guration (x L ; x M ; x R ) an equilibrium (e; ) exists in which x M = m is adopted with probability one.
Consider a given con…guration of positions (x L ; m; x R ), and suppose that an equilibrium (e; ) exists in which x L is adopted with a strictly positive probability.
To prove the result, it is su¢ cient to show that for a given con…guration (x 2 ), all the conditions from Lemma 3 are equivalent under the Plurality rule and the Alternative Vote rule.
Since for a given F ( ), the third part of condition (iii) is non-generic on X, we have generically that Y AV R = Y P R .
